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Authors submitting articles to The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction are expected to do so in good faith and are solely responsible for the 
content therein. Views expressed in The Journal are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CISR, James Madison University, the U.S. 
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I
n 1999, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines issued a 
seminal report entitled Landmine Monitor: Toward a Mine-Free 
World. How prophetic they were on the one hand, and how unbri-
dled and unrealistic the Campaign was on the other. Fresh off the 1997 
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), the report notes a U.S. 
State Department 1998 declaration that removal had surpassed plant-
ing, and “it appears that we have turned the tide in the battle against 
mines, and that it is possible to solve the AP [anti-personnel] mine cri-
sis in years not decades.”1 The report, stating that the past decade has 
focused on the threat to innocent civilians, heralds the emergence of 
a development assistance oriented approach toward demining, known 
as humanitarian mine action (HMA),2 which is
an integrated approach to removing landmines from the ground 
and reducing their disastrous impact on mine-affected communi-
ties. Nobody knows how many mines there are in the ground, and 
that number is not very relevant, despite the attention given to 
the issue. What is relevant is how many people are affected by the 
presence of mines, which are obstacles to post-conflict reconstruc-
tion and socio-economic re-development.3
The campaign’s enthusiasm around rapid resolution of the prob-
lem was not misguided; after all, parties to the APMBC agreed to 
clear their contaminated territory within ten years. Two decades later, 
however, the international community continues to set new clearance 
timeframes while providing continued assistance.
Supporting the U.S. Department of State remove explosive hazards from a public fuel depot near Mosul, Iraq, which helped restore transportation operations critical 
to agricultural activity.
Photo courtesy of Tetra Tech project photo.
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Around the time of the initial 1999 Landmine Monitor report, the 
UN held the Millennium Summit in 2000 where member nations 
adopted an agreement known as the Millennium Declaration, which 
set forth goals and principles geared toward ending underdevelop-
ment and abject poverty, and promoting peace and security. From this 
agreement, eight broad goals were issued around social-, economic-, 
and health-based objectives known as the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). The goals covered poverty, education, gender equality, 
child mortality, maternal health, disease, the environment, and global 
partnership, and established twenty-one specific development targets 
along with sixty indicators to be achieved by 2015.4 Some states met 
some objectives, a few achieved many, while many states achieved few, 
if any, objectives.
The 2015 UN Summit was devoted to the next round of develop-
ment goals, and the international community discussed the range of 
challenges and impediments toward lasting development, security, 
and stability faced by so many countries. The summit also celebrated 
successes, as broadly measured by quality-of-life gains like positive 
changes in poverty (those living above the $1.25 per day standard), 
access to clean water, literacy improvements, and gender parity in pri-
mary education.5 Understanding better the success and shortfalls of 
the MDG process (2000–2015) was critical, and the insight gleaned was 
valuable for understanding how to meet the new development goals set 
for 2015–2030, known as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Unfortunately, the relationships between mines and development 
were not addressed by policy and programming surrounding the 2000 
MDGs, nor during the 1997 establishment of the International Mine 
Action Standards (IMAS) and the United Nations Mine Action Service 
(UNMAS). Moreover, while some policy writing around the last mil-
lennium did explore the issue, the SDGs of 2015 still did not address 
landmines and demining as intermediate variables along the pathway 
to development. This lack of connectivity will be addressed further, but 
for now, the point is that establishing a relationship between HMA 
and global development goals was not done well previously, and 
doing so now is critical for the future of HMA.
THE FUNDING DOMAIN
At a macro level, globalism currently competes with an inward-
looking nationalistic populism that is pressing for reduced levels of 
foreign assistance while demanding greater accountability for any 
overseas investments based on “national interest.” The argument at 
hand is driven by concern over value for money, return on investment, 
and a sustainable, demonstrable impact. Fiscal responsibility is thus 
the clarion call to which both the global assistance and HMA commu-
nities must answer—and with clear substantiation, as both are often 
considered foreign policy tools.6 
Donors contribute for varying reasons, depending on amount, 
cause, beneficiaries, recipients, and timing. While motives may range 
from altruism to legislative mandate (i.e., the United Kingdom), to 
unabashed self-interest, countries nonetheless expect a return on their 
humanitarian assistance—whether it be increased stability, enhanced 
self-sufficiency, improved relationships, future market access for 
the donor’s private sector, or all of the above. Regardless of political 
ideology, the use of public revenue to support socioeconomic needs 
in other countries is receiving more scrutiny, along with more con-
sistent and wider expectations for demonstrable results, benefitting 
both recipient and donor. Additionally, further challenges may yet 
arise as the vast amount of donor support is concentrated quite nar-
rowly—both in terms of the percentage of support offered by a handful 
of donors as well as the majority of assistance being provided to just a 
handful of recipient countries. 
According to the 2019 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, 
the three largest mine action donors from 2014 to 2018 (United States, 
European Union, and Japan) account for nearly 58 percent of all fund-
ing. The top seven donors (adding the United Kingdom, Germany, 
Norway, and the Netherlands) accounted for $2.147 billion of the 
$2.629 billion in total assistance.
Also according to the 2019 Landmine Monitor, the level of US 
funding alone over this time frame, $947.1 million, accounted for 36 
percent of total global funding.7 However, the US 2017 HMA fund-
ing of $320.6 million was more than double the US 2016 HMA con-
tribution of $152.4 million. Additionally, more than half of the 2017 
funds ($169.35 million) went to projects in Iraq and Syria alone.8 In 
comparison, these two countries received $17 million more than the 
total US 2016 contribution, and of that $152.4 million, $106.55 mil-
lion went to Iraq.9
Fortunately, US funding has remained strong for years, with consis-
tent bipartisan congressional and presidential support. Despite recent 
annual averages of roughly $200 million from the United States alone, 
resources fall short compared to need.  Overall, while there are approx-
imately sixty contaminated countries, six countries alone received 
nearly 52 percent ($1.361 billion) of the total 2014–2018 funding for 
mine action assistance.10
With these challenges in mind, a brief look at global development 
assistance funding is warranted. As noted in the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in Table 1, total net 
resource flows for global development assistance steadily decreased in 
terms of the percentage of cumulative donor Gross National Income 
(GNI) from 2010 to 2017, with the exception of 2014. Fortunately, the 
actual dollar amounts of development assistance remained relatively 
steady, with upticks in 2016 and 2017.
In 2018, overseas official development assistance was $149.3 billion, 
though “foreign direct investment to developing countries dropped by 
around a third from 2016 to 2017, following a 12 percent drop in overall 
external finance from 2013 to 2016.”11 Additionally, recent assistance 
levels were weakened by the significant sums spent on Middle East 
refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) costs—for example, the 
level of donor assistance expenditures focused on refugee costs alone 
increased in 2016 by 27.5 percent to $15.4 billion from 2015 costs.12
These financial snapshots suggests several takeaways for the HMA 
community: (1) overarching development assistance is somewhat 
unstable, (2) enormous sums, comparatively, flow through development 
assistance streams, and (3) critical issue areas for Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) policy include considerations highly connected to 
HMA—namely, humanitarian assistance funding, cost of displaced 
persons, and direct foreign investment and other private funding.
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Most critical, however, is the need to recognize that the HMA 
community has an important opportunity to better align with, and 
integrate into, global development assistance objectives. Integration 
is imperative at this time when many donor countries face internal 
sociopolitical pressures to focus public spending internally and to bet-
ter substantiate returns on their investments made abroad. Two of the 
biggest HMA donors, the United States and the United Kingdom, for 
example, are each mired in political consternation about reducing for-
eign assistance spending and reorganizing their national foreign assis-
tance institutions and mandates. While global funding for HMA was 
at an all-time high in 2017 and 2018,13 increased donor fatigue toward 
HMA and development assistance is a real possibility (particularly 
should donor assistance disproportionately shift toward global health 
requirements, and even more so should a global recession emerge as 
a result of COVID-19), as is the uncertainty associated with chang-
ing foreign policy and national security priorities related to assisting 
conflict-affected countries, peacekeeping missions, and the larger 
Overseas Contingency Operations (to use a US term). With increased 
competition for potentially diminishing funds, strengthening the 
synergistic HMA-development relationship may help both commu-
nities achieve more with less.
FLIPPING THE SCRIPT: CHANGING THE ETHOS 
FROM CASUALTY REDUCTION TO SUPPORTING 
DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES
Much HMA progress over the past two decades has come from a ded-
icated and consistent higher-order message that was the cornerstone 
of the initial campaign: mine action saves innocent lives.14 That said, 
however, the horrors of chronic underdevelopment far eclipse damage 
caused by mines and munitions when measured in deaths and victims.
The 2019 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor reported 149 
square kilometers cleared worldwide in 2016,15 when global victims 
totaled 9,439 (the second highest total in over twenty years),16 includ-
ing approximately 2,100 deaths.17 Typical estimates are that over 80 
percent of mine victims are civilian and almost half are children—in 
many instances because they are working in fields or picking up scrap 
metal to help earn family income. In contrast, an analysis of global 
health data indicate that an “innocent victimization” milieu around 
children in the developing world in 2016 was considerably worse:
• One in twelve children under the age of five in sub-Saharan 
Africa died, and one in twenty-two died in South Asia; the North 
American ratio was 1:152 and the European ratio was 1:204.
• 2.78 million children under the age of five in sub-Saharan Africa 
died, along with another 1.73 million children in South Asia. 
This contrasts with 28,000 North American deaths and 43,000 
in Europe.19
• Deaths among children aged five to fourteen in sub-Saharan 
Africa totaled 513, 000, 241,000 in Southern Asia, 10,000 in 
Europe, and 6,000 in North America.20
• 407,000 people died from malaria in Africa alone.21
• 525,000 children died from diarrhoeal diseases, with over 1,400 
deaths per day.22
• 1.4 million children under the age of five died from acute lower 
respiratory infection, more than 95 percent of whom were from 
low and middle income countries.23
The main point of these examples is not to suggest the horror and out-
rage associated with munitions contaminants should lessen, but rather 
the emphasis on how mines/munitions preclude development outcomes 
should concurrently sharpen. For instance, all of the above mortality 
categories are considered preventable—if the levels of national devel-
opment were improved.24 Perhaps the policy orientation of HMA 
needs to include the alignment between mine action and the SDGs, 
and toward the contributory impact mine action success or failure has 
on social, political, and economic well-being.
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Total Official Development 
Assistance and Private 
Flows*
512,792 504,701 477,702 450,382 587,731 315,651 317,435 422,968
Only Official Development 
Assistance ** 128,484 135,111 127,030 134,847 137,539 131,563 144,921 147,160
Total Flows as % of GNI 1.25 1.14 1.07 0.99 1.26 0.72 0.71 .89
* This includes bilateral and multilateral institutional assistance, along with other official public investment, as well as all private direct investment and private grants.  
** Only governmental bilateral and multilateral institutional assistance is included. 
Table 1. OECD Global Development Assistance Trendline (in millions). 
Figure courtesy of OECD International Development Statistics, Volume 2018 Issue 1.
Children in a Central Africa Republic community that Tetra Tech was assisting 
under a USAID illegal mining and conflict diamonds project.
Photo courtesy of Tetra Tech.
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Although the sine qua non role of mine action in post-conflict recon-
struction and stabilization countries is generally understood, under-
taking more specific causal pathway mapping exercises does not seem 
widespread. Much like modelling used to measure the impact of donor 
and foreign direct investment on post-war reconstruction to help guide 
economic growth, algorithmic models could highlight the potential 
impact of appropriate, timely, and sufficient HMA on development 
objectives and the corresponding impact on resulting economic growth 
forecasting. Likewise, and conversely, models should run the potential 
impact of insufficient or non-existent munitions response. 25 
This should not be an overly onerous task, given a twenty-plus 
year applied policy and programming research base from the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD, estab-
lished in 1998), The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, 
and the Peace Research Institute Oslo’s (PRIO) project: Assistance to 
Mine-Affected Communities, which ran from 1999–2009. The United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) also works closely with the 
GICHD and PRIO (and others), co-sponsoring events and research, 
and the UN Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action 
(IACG-MA) has long had between twelve and fourteen members 
whose mandates include some aspect of mine action as well as devel-
opment assistance.
In spite of some efforts to create bridgeheads on each side, the spans 
connecting HMA and development assistance communities have 
not been adequately built. For example, no references to economic 
growth and development were made in the original 1999 Maputo 
Declaration nor in the ensuing 2014 Review Conference. Similarly, 
the 2016 Convention on Cluster Munitions had just one reference to 
victim assistance and development. Neither demining nor 
HMA were associated with the 2000 MDG efforts, or, more 
sadly, in the literature and conversations surrounding the 
2015 SDGs, including the UN publication Transforming our 
World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development).26
Perhaps more important, however, IMAS Series 14 
(Evaluation of Mine Action Programmes 14.10 and 14.20) 
makes scarce reference to development.27 Neither docu-
ment even raises the idea of exploring measurable connec-
tions between HMA activities and development outcomes 
and impacts. Although Series 14 is overdue for an update 
(all IMAS publications are scheduled for updates every three 
years), it is possible that the task and imperative before 
us will be better served by a new IMAS series focused on 
aligning and measuring the relationship between mine 
action and development. At the very least, an IMAS 14.30 
should be considered.
Most important though, the November 2019 Oslo Review 
Conference does make clear that mine action is a “key 
enabler for development, humanitarian action, peace and 
security”28 and that the corresponding Action Plan for 
2020-2024 includes focal points for HMA to further the 
achievement of the SDGs.  The time is indeed right for HMA 
to evolve as a significant component of this development/
security equation—one more widely and publicly seen and under-
stood, and one better articulated in terms of evidence-based input, 
with HMA becoming an intervening variable contributing toward a 
larger series of ends, namely the SDGs. This evolution will require 
demonstrating return on investment in terms of both the technical 
aspects of HMA, e.g., monitoring and evaluating current key perfor-
mance indicators (KPIs),29 and on a new set of impact analytics that 
measure how HMA serves as an intervening variable on a range of 
development objectives and outcomes.
INCREASING THE BANG FOR THE BUCK: 
DEMONSTRATING VALUE, SUBSTANTIATING 
RETURN ON INVESTMENT
HMA donor support has tended to be tied more toward a given for-
eign policy or national security platform rather than a development 
assistance agenda. The United States, for example, has provided more 
than $3.7 billion dollars of total conventional weapons destruction 
assistance to over 100 countries from 1993–2019, making the United 
States the single largest donor by far.  However, just under $1.6 billion 
was spent on only five countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Laos, Cambodia, 
and Vietnam).30 This pattern of linking mine assistance to national 
security and foreign policy is consistent with other large donors. The 
point is this approach will have to change if HMA is to play a signifi-
cant contributory role in achieving the global SDGs. A wider country 
distribution pattern is one approach; however, integrating HMA more 
widely into development assistance policy and programming ought to 
enable more countries to provide more support to HMA efforts.
Similarly, development assistance is increasingly becoming more of 
a foreign policy and/or national security tool. In terms of additional 
With support from the U.S. Department of State and other donors, the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic has linked UXO removal to its National Development plan, where female demining 
teams play an important role in UXO Lao’s efforts to clear land for economic development.
Photo courtesy of Tetra Tech project photo.
4
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 3
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol24/iss1/3
THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION8
similarities, the intent of both HMA support and development assis-
tance is to lessen suffering, fear, risk, and both physical and economic 
insecurity, and to improve human and community well-being. Also, 
the performance and impact of both communities should be held 
accountable.31 Although both communities ought to be exploring their 
relationship more explicitly, perhaps the onus falls on the HMA com-
munity to better demonstrate its value to development assistance.
If mine action is to receive the support needed to accomplish the 
larger HMA mission, it will likely need to adopt a value-for-money 
orientation, defining and operationalizing a performance-based 
management approach toward development outcomes. The sector 
must be able to both articulate and substantiate evidenced-based 
policy, programming, and budgeting capabilities and results. 
Demonstrating value is particularly important as Stanley Brown 
(U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State) recently noted, the “global 
need for HMA programs continues to outstrip available resources.”32 
Moreover, in the post-COVID-19 economy, resources for both HMA 
and development assistance writ large may be further challenged.
Although the HMA community will likely be better served by taking 
the initiative, defining, tracking, and reporting on development and 
outcome-based KPIs will require cooperation and collaboration with 
the development assistance community. Ideally, both communities 
will be able to articulate how the presence or absence of HMA affects 
development goals from the immediate to the long-term (including 
the policy and programming distinctions between humanitarian 
assistance and longer-term development). Noting that we are already 
one-third through the fifteen-year SDG performance period, such an 
outcome will require immediate action on the part of both communi-
ties to increase dialogue in earnest, to better and more fully frame and 
initiate operational research agendas, to pilot targeted programs, and 
to develop and execute a monitoring, evaluation, and learning regi-
ment focused on HMA-SDG relationships.
This process will require widespread recognition of the need for 
policy, programming, and budget evolution/maturation associated 
with mainstreaming HMA into development assistance (see endnote 
25). The joint GICHD and UNDP report “Leaving No One Behind” 
provides a solid foundation on which to build, as does the 2019 Oslo 
Review Conference report.33 Illustrative areas where over a half cen-
tury of relevant development assistance expertise can be applied to 
existing HMA include:
• Assistance with improving assessments, monitoring, evalua-
tion, and learning (to include knowledge and data manage-
ment systems)
• Enhancing sustainable land management and use—including 
strong return on investment estimating to prioritize actions 
(including a focus on critical infrastructure and resumption of 
economic activity)
• Institutional strengthening of national mine action authori-
ties—including improving transparency and accountability, 
and management/leadership capabilities
• Helping national authorities develop a whole-of-government ori-
entation, working more effectively with other national ministries, 
including integrating HMA into national development plans34
• Assisting contaminated countries with preparedness and resil-
iency related to environmental and climate-oriented changes 
that might increase explosive ordnance hazards
• Helping define and promote public-private partnerships 
The HMA and development assistance relationship should have dif-
ferent degrees of connectivity or alignment in different circumstances, 
as Gasser noted.35 There are instances where
1. No formal linkage can or should be made, such as when political 
and/or security considerations supersede development efforts.
2. Coordination should be the objective when development priori-
ties focus on jobs and anti-poverty objectives while the political-
military imperatives are weapons removal and abatement and 
clearing ground.
3. HMA leads and is an enabler of development assistance when 
munitions prioritization takes precedent and development 
activities require clearance a priori before they can begin.
4. Active integrated planning and execution is prioritized, and 
HMA efforts and objectives are viewed as part of an overall 
development strategy—in other words, mine action impact is a 
formal part of a development impact assessment such that a low-
priority mine action area might be cleared first to help accom-
plish development objectives.
In the end, if actionable correlations between HMA and the SDGs 
can be framed, supported, and communicated, the value for money 
argument becomes easier in terms of attracting resources from both 
public and private sources, including increased direct foreign invest-
ment.36 This alignment and integration of HMA and development will 
not only enable more effective and efficient targeting of whatever 
resources are available, but will also improve investment risk mitiga-
tion, which may in turn generate more sustainable post-clearance 
investments. As HMA activities are better framed as enablers and cat-
alysts for development as opposed to separate precursors to develop-
ment, the value for money argument is strengthened, further justifying 
sustained mine action expenditures. 
See endnotes page 68
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